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A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Representation of Kurds by Non-Kurds on Social Media: English Twitter Comments as an Example

(An extract from Master's dissertation)

Mardin Ameer Mahmood, Karmand Abdulla Hamad

Department of English, Faculty of Arts, Soran University, Iraqi Kurdistan Region

Article Info		Abstract:
Received:	May, 2025	<p>This paper investigates the way Kurds are represented by non-Kurds, particularly Turks, in English-language Twitter posts, using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as its main framework. It looks into how processes like othering, dehumanization, and ethnic hostility are constructed and spread through digital discourse. It also aims to assess how severe and intense this discourse is.</p> <p>To collect data, snowball and purposive sampling methods were used to gather 530 comments replying to 12 pro-Kurdish tweets posted by public figures between 2018 and 2025. The analysis combines both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Fairclough's CDA framework, applied through a netnographic lens, is used to qualitatively examine the data and address the first two research questions. At the same time, a quantitative content analysis is conducted using Bahador's Hate Speech Intensity Scale to measure the level of hostility in the comments.</p> <p>The findings reveal that nearly 40% of the analyzed comments exhibit high to extreme levels of hate speech, including demonization, incitement to violence, and explicit death threats. Common discursive tactics include labeling Kurds as "terrorists," denying the existence of Kurdish identity or statehood, and equating cultural recognition with political threat.</p> <p>The study concludes that Twitter, as a widely accessible public platform, provides space for expressing ethnic bias through language shaped by underlying nationalist ideologies. By integrating a measurable hate speech scale into a qualitative framework, the study contributes to a better understanding of digital discrimination and offers useful insights into how harmful discourse can be addressed and how ethnic conflict might be prevented.</p>
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Corresponding Author		
mardinmahmoud266@gmail.com karmand.hamad@soran.edu.iq		

Introduction:

Social media has become a significant platform for expressing individual and group ideologies, representing social and political perspectives, and constructing identities. Language is a significant contributor to the construction and maintenance of such social hierarchies, ideologies, and group identities. Over the last few decades, a strong set tool for analyzing how language performs power and perpetuates inequality in different social interactions has emerged (Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, 2001). Since social media has become more deeply rooted in public debate, knowledge about ethnic identity construction and controversy in the online world is gaining importance. Twitter (now X) is one of the many platforms that remain crucial for the occurrence of ethnic conflicts, nationalist ideologies, and cultural stereotypes in the present day, as these are performed through language. These online spheres have become both places of visibility and targets of hatred for such stateless and historically oppressed groups as the Kurds.

Kurdish people, who are largely located in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, have for long been subjected to political and cultural oppression. In Turkey, Kurdish identity is commonly classified into a criminal aspect, lack of recognition, or the conditions of a security threat (Bayır, 2013; Yarkin, 2023). This hostility has strong historical backgrounds but continues to be reconstructed in contemporary forms, particularly within digital discourse. Media has a huge impact on how ethnic minorities are defined by the public, and various studies have proved that the way Kurds are represented is often dehumanizing and highly politicized (Sezgin and Wall, 2004; Tutkal, 2024). The English-speaking digital environment is not the exception. Despite its role as a global language for diplomacy and human rights, English may also serve, at times, as a medium for spreading xenophobic and ethnocentric views.

Scholars of CDA have emphasized the important role that “othering” and “dehumanization” practices have in the perpetuation of ethnic hierarchies (van Dijk, 1998; Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Such strategies recognize minority groups as inferior, irrational, or dangerous, hence providing the justification for the policies of exclusion and social discrimination. Compounded by social media’s participatory and multimodal activity, social media not only permits the broadcasting of such discourse but also enhances its spread in the form of algorithmic reinforcement (Daniels, 2013; Bouvier and Machin, 2018). Recent studies validate the frequency of ethnic hate speech in such virtual spaces as Twitter, where hostile discourse is represented by negative labels, metaphors of animalization, and terrorism (Matamoros-Fernández and Farkas, 2021; Tutkal, 2024). Scholars have also debated the limits of the definition of hate speech, agreeing on its ambiguity but remaining conscious of its real-world effects. Some of the legal definitions, however, aim at incitement to violence or hatred (Council of Europe, 1997), while others take a broader approach and embrace such aspects as stereotyping and excluding language (Davidson et al., 2017; Brown, 2017). Different typologies about the degree and shape of hate speech have been suggested, such as those separating low-level prejudice and extreme incitement. These include the Hate Speech Intense Scale (Bahador, 2020), which has become increasingly relevant for identifying rhetorical severity and mapping digital hostility in a structured context.

Problem statement

Social media has become one of the broadest channels for sending messages and sharing ideologies and thoughts. It enables people to communicate within seconds, regardless of their location or distance. Moreover, it is used to express attitudes of compassion, bias, or hostility. The Kurdish issue dates back hundreds of years. Kurds, one of the largest stateless nations, have struggled for their own independence and have faced significant opposition from neighboring states such as Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Thus, the negative representation of Kurds has been communicated in different ways, one of which is through social media platforms. People from these neighboring nations openly use such platforms to express their

hostility. While there has recently been an increase in the negative representation of Kurds on social media, little is known about how this is expressed in English-language media, particularly on Twitter. As it stands, there are few studies that comprehensively address this gap, creating significant research potential in how language is used to portray Kurds online.

This paper aims to fill this gap by examining how Turkish users express hostility against Kurds. More specifically, the study seeks to uncover how processes of othering, dehumanization, and ethnic marginalization are constructed through discourse. Thus, it can contribute to academic and public awareness of how language plays a fundamental role in both creating and sustaining ethnic discrimination and hate speech in the age of the internet.

Research Objectives

This paper seeks to examine how Kurdish people are represented by non-Kurdish individuals, such as Turkish Twitter users, in their English-language comments. It aims to understand how language and its use shape online perceptions of Kurds. One of the main areas of focus is identifying how specific discursive strategies—such as othering, dehumanization, and cultural denial—are used to portray Kurds in a negative light. However, the study also aims to highlight instances of positive attitudes expressed by Turkish users toward the Kurds.

Another key objective is to determine the severity of hate speech employed in these tweets. To accomplish this, the study draws on the Hate Speech Intensity Scale developed by Bahador, which allows for categorizing and quantifying the level of intensity or harm the language may carry. The integration of qualitative discourse analysis with a structured measurement scale enables the research to demonstrate not only what people are saying, but also how deeply such messages are embedded and how aggressive they can be.

Ultimately, the aim of the study is to draw attention to the impact of ethnic bias on the internet through language, and to contribute to a broader conversation about digital hate speech, cultural representation, and the persuasive power of words in shaping social behavior.

Research Questions

This study attempts to address the following research questions:

1. How are Kurds framed and represented in in English-language Twitter posts?
2. What discursive strategies are employed in these representations by non-Kurdish users?
3. To what extent do these tweets contain hate speech, and how are they constructed?

Significance of the Study

The current project expands the existing literature on Critical Discourse Analysis by addressing gaps in various ways. Firstly, it contributes new knowledge to the field of CDA, as the subject of the representation of Kurds in social media discourses has not been sufficiently explored. As a result, this study sheds light on how negative ideologies toward Kurds are manifested by Turkish users through comments in English on Twitter.

Second, this research provides insights into the impact of social media in fostering political, cultural, and ideological conflicts. Thus, it seeks to provide a better understanding of the nature of the appearance of such representations of Kurds on the global web, in order to detect patterns of aggression and hate speech against Kurds in the context of xenophobia, discrimination, and intolerance in the modern world.

Finally, the results of the current study could provide a bank of information for linguists, language scholars, teachers, government, and non-governmental organizations who attempt to support cultural diversity and counter ethnic discrimination, based on a better understanding of how language encodes human thoughts and internal feelings.

Theoretical Background

1. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is the main framework of this study. It examines how language functions in maintaining and legitimizing social hierarchies and ideologies. CDA regards language as a social practice that is shaped by and simultaneously shapes societal structures. Over the last few decades, scholars such as Fairclough (1992), van Dijk (1993), and Wodak (2001) have developed CDA into a powerful approach for revealing how discourse contributes to systems of power and exclusion.

Fairclough's model draws attention to the three dimensions of discourse: the textual level, discursive practice (production and interpretation), and sociocultural practice (the broader context), as shown in




Figure 1. Three-dimensional conception of discourse (adopted from Fairclough, 1992)

Figure 1: Three-dimensional conception of discourse.

In this study, Fairclough's CDA theory helps to explore how anti-Kurdish sentiments are discursively constructed by non-Kurdish users on Twitter, and how these expressions reflect broader ideologies of Turkish nationalism. Through this lens, the research analyzes the language used in English-language comments that respond to pro-Kurdish content, investigating how meaning is constructed and ideology is encoded through the use of certain linguistic forms.

2. Hate Speech

Hate speech is another key concept in this study. It has been widely discussed in both legal and academic contexts, though its boundaries remain debated. The Council of Europe (1997) defines hate speech as all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote, or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, antisemitism, or other forms of hatred based on intolerance. In addition to this definition, researchers such as Davidson et al. (2017) and Brown (2017) argue that hate speech can also involve stereotyping, excluding, or delegitimizing individuals or groups based on race, color, ethnicity, or identity. These views help in identifying hate not only in direct threats but also in subtle discursive forms such as sarcasm, framing, and identity denial.

This study investigates how hate speech functions within English-language comments that target Kurdish individuals or groups. It takes into account various forms of expression and uses CDA to uncover the underlying ideologies behind them.

3. Bahador's Hate Speech Intensity Scale

To classify the intensity of hate speech in this study, the Hate Speech Intensity Scale developed by Bahador (2020) is used. This model breaks down hate speech into six levels, as shown in *Table 1: Hate Speech Intensity Scale*.







Color	Title	Description	Examples
	6. Death	Rhetoric includes literal killing by group. Responses include the literal death/elimination of a group.	Killed, annihilate, destroy
	5. Violence	Rhetoric includes infliction of physical harm or metaphoric/aspirational physical harm or death. Responses include calls for literal violence or metaphoric/aspirational physical harm or death.	Punched, raped, starved, torturing, mugging
	4. Demonizing and Dehumanizing	Rhetoric includes subhuman and superhuman characteristics.	Rat, monkey, Nazi, demon, cancer, monster
	3. Negative Character	Rhetoric includes nonviolent characterizations and insults.	Stupid, thief, aggressor, fake, crazy
	2. Negative Actions	Rhetoric includes negative nonviolent actions associated with the group.	Threatened, stole, outrageous act, poor treatment, alienate
	1. Disagreement	Rhetoric includes disagreeing at the idea/belief level. Responses include challenging claims, ideas, beliefs, or trying to change their view.	False, incorrect, wrong, challenge, persuade, change minds

Table 1: Hate Speech Intensity Scale (adopted from Bahador 2020)

Each level reflects a different degree of rhetorical aggression. Bahador's scale provides a clear classification of hostile expressions, helping distinguish between slight disagreement and language that incites violence or promotes killing. In this study, the scale is applied to English-language Twitter comments to assess the frequency and severity of anti-Kurdish expressions. It contributes both as a categorization tool and as part of the theoretical structure that connects language to ideology.

4. Othering and Dehumanization

The concepts of othering and dehumanization are essential to understanding how Kurdish identity is constructed in online spaces. Othering refers to the discursive separation of the in-group and the out-group. It frames the "Other" as inferior, irrational, or threatening and serves as a foundation for exclusion and discrimination (Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

Dehumanization takes this process further by removing human qualities from individuals or groups. This is often done through metaphors of animals or criminality. As shown in Tutkal's (2024) study, anti-Kurdish tweets frequently use terms like "rats," "scum," and "terrorists" to degrade and delegitimize Kurdish individuals. These strategies make it easier to justify hostility and silence toward the group being targeted. In this study, these concepts are used to analyze the rhetorical strategies found in the comments. The analysis explores how identity denial, labeling, and violent metaphors construct Kurds as less human and less entitled to rights or sympathy.

5. Relevance to Research Design

The concepts and theoretical frameworks discussed above; CDA, hate speech, Bahador's scale, othering, and dehumanization, not only shape the analysis but also informed the research design. They guide the selection of English-language Twitter comments, chosen for their ideological significance and public accessibility. Since English is often associated with global human rights discourse, analyzing tweets in this language reveals how nationalist ideologies are expressed in an international context.

These frameworks also direct the development of coding categories and discursive themes. They provide the criteria for identifying how language encodes hostility, constructs group identity, and legitimizes symbolic violence.

Materials and Methods

This study examines how non-Kurds, mainly Turks, portray Kurds in English-language discourse on Twitter. The research uses a mixed-method design, grounded in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to highlight both positive and negative attitudes toward the Kurds, and is supported by Bahador's (2020) Hate Speech Intensity Scale to classify the strength of hostile language. The blend of qualitative discourse analysis and quantitative scoring allows the study to address online ethnic hostility from several aspects and identify its linguistic features.

Twelve posts from Twitter, covering the period between 2018 and 2025, form the dataset of this study, consisting of 530 English-language comments. These posts were written by real public figures, including journalists, policy experts, and political commentators who voiced pro-Kurdish opinions or touched upon Kurdish identity and rights issues. Comments chosen for analysis were posted in the English language by non-Kurdish individuals, mostly identified as Turks. The comments were excerpted in anonymous form through the digital Export Comments tool for analysis.

Sampling was purposive in nature and involved tweets and replies that had direct relevance to Kurdish issues. To enlarge the dataset, the snowball sampling method was also utilized to identify additional relevant discourse threads by following the replies, retweets, and engagement patterns related to the selected posts.

In terms of analysis, Norman Fairclough's (1992) three-dimensional model of Critical Discourse Analysis is used. From this perspective, the study points out both positive attitudes and critical discursive practices for excluding the Kurds, including dehumanization, cultural erasure, and nationalist rhetoric.

To analyze the level of hate speech intensity, a modified version of Bahador's (2020) Hate Speech Intensity Scale was adopted. According to this classification, hostile language is categorized into six ascending levels. Each of the 530 comments was scored individually using this scale. This allowed the researcher not only to find patterns of representation but also to measure the degree of ethnic violence.

Ethical principles for digital research were followed strictly. All publicly available data was used, and none of the individuals' personal communications were accessed. For privacy, usernames and identifiers were preserved anonymously. The research was based on adherence to the ethical guidelines of social media research and linguistic data analysis.

Although this study deals with English-language content (which makes access to global discourse easier), the choice of English-language materials may omit considerable native-language expressions of anti-Kurdish sentiment. Additionally, since profiles on social media are self-reported, assumptions about users' ethnic or national identities were made based on publicly available information such as usernames and bio descriptions.

This methodology of analysis establishes a strong foundation for illustrating the intersection of digital discourse, ethnic representation, and hate speech in a politically sensitive setting.

Data Analysis

The analysis used 530 English-language Twitter comments from 2018 to 2025 that were posted in response to pro-Kurdish tweets by various public figures. The majority of the comments within the selected posts included frequent signs of ethnic bias. By combining Fairclough's CDA and Bahador's Hate Speech Intensity Scale (2020), the research examined both positive and negative comments representing the Kurds, assessed the intensity of hostile language, and identified how Kurds were portrayed within the digital discourse.

Qualitative content analysis, based on Fairclough's CDA, analyzed the comments across three dimensions. Textually, the language includes emotional forms, as well as aggressive and derogatory metaphors. The repetition of derogatory nouns and verbs contributed to a narrative of inferiority and criminality, stripping Kurds of individuality and complexity. Frequent use of terms like "traitors," "filthy," and "vermin" functioned semantically to otherize and degrade their moral status—a classic linguistic tactic of exclusion. Pronouns such as "they" and "them" formed a consistent pattern of collective generalization.

The CDA of the comments also revealed numerous ways in which Kurdish culture was undermined and insulted. For example, users wrote statements such as "They are not Kurds, they are terrorists," and "You and your PKK people are dogs of the US and Israel." This linguistic framing commonly linked Kurdish identity with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), rather than distinguishing between the two. Comments like "Kurds are terrorist people," "We will continue ridding this world of Kurdish terrorism until the last terrorist burns in hell," and "Kurds = PKK = Terrorists" demonstrate how the vague generalization that Kurds are terrorists was used to justify the mistreatment of Kurds by Turkish authorities. Many users also portrayed Kurds as inherently disloyal, claiming they sought to destabilize Turkey. Examples include: "Kurds are the virus of this world," "Kurds are always the traitors in every region, no one likes you at all," and "You are scum trying to divide our country"—all suggesting that Kurdish identity inherently threatened Turkish unity.

Discursively, this reflects the strategy of recontextualization, in which Kurdish identity is reduced to its perceived association with separatism and terrorism, erasing cultural and political nuance. The production and reception of such messages imply an audience predisposed to nationalistic values and resistant to pluralism. Kurdish aspirations for self-governance were delegitimized through association with state enemies, thereby justifying both state violence and public hostility.

The government also frequently refuted the history and culture of the Kurds. Several comments suggested that Kurdish ethnicity is not real, claiming that Kurds are merely mountain Turks or do not exist at all. Examples included: "Kurds are mountain Turks," "There's no such thing as Kurdistan," and "Show me Kurdistan on the map." These expressions labeled Kurdish identity as fictional, thereby discrediting it. Such comments often included slogans calling for unity under one flag, implying the denial of cultural rights for minorities. Phrases like "Long live Turkey, death to traitors" and "We are all Turks" illustrate how nationalism was presented as the only legitimate identity. This rhetorical approach works to undermine Kurdish history with the intent to erase it from collective memory.

In terms of sociocultural practice, this aligns with the hegemonic narrative of a homogeneous Turkish state. Denial of Kurdish ethnicity sustains a monoethnic national identity and uses historical narratives to delegitimize autonomy claims. Broader social structures—such as education, media, and law—are reflected and reinforced in these social media expressions, which echo institutional discourses of ethnic centralism.

Among the analyzed comments, some users employed sarcasm, humor, and narrative inversion. Turkish users often portrayed Kurds as aggressors and themselves as victims. Some tweets depicted Kurds as inherently violent or uncivilized, thus justifying cultural suppression. For example, one sarcastic tweet stated, "We took them in, and this is how they repay us," while another asked, "Where did 500,000 Kurds flee to in 1991?" These comments drew on broader ethnonationalist narratives and sought to justify state actions as national defense. Notably, many such comments were made in English—intentionally. By using English, supporters of Turkish state narratives attempted to frame anti-Kurdish views as aligned with global counterterrorism discourses, potentially to influence Western perceptions and bypass local censorship. Comments such as "This isn't about Kurds, it's about stopping terrorism" exemplify how ethnic hostility was reframed as a matter of national security.

This tactic reflects ideological maneuvering, a discursive technique in Fairclough's model where hate is reframed as rational discourse. Here, English is not just a communication tool but a geopolitical strategy—positioning anti-Kurdish sentiment in alignment with Western security language. This global staging of nationalism sanitizes hostile messages for international legitimacy.

Across the dataset, hostile comments outnumbered pro-Kurdish ones by a significant margin. While some pro-Kurdish comments expressed support for human rights and minority recognition, such voices were scarce and often met with backlash. Those advocating for Kurdish rights were frequently labeled “terrorist sympathizers,” “Zionist puppets,” or “PKK dogs,” demonstrating the polarized nature of ethnic discourse online. These responses suggest that offline societal divisions are mirrored—and potentially intensified—in digital platforms. Such reactions exemplify discursive policing, where dissenting voices are targeted to enforce ideological conformity. The binary opposition of “loyalist vs. traitor” dominates these exchanges, rendering support for Kurdish rights as betrayal. Social media becomes a platform for nationalist surveillance and public shaming.

Hate speech intensity did not follow a consistent upward or downward trend across the seven-year period. Peaks in hostile comments generally coincided with major political events related to the Kurds, such as Turkish military campaigns or global discussions on Kurdish independence. This suggests that online ethnic hostility is responsive to geopolitical developments, reflecting and amplifying real-world tensions.

These temporal fluctuations show that digital discourse is event-driven, intensifying during periods of political salience. Online platforms serve as echo chambers for offline conflict, highlighting how media can escalate nationalistic sentiment and merge virtual hostility with real-life antagonism.

The quantitative analysis of 530 comments, using Bahador's (2020) six-level hate speech scale, revealed varying intensities of anti-Kurdish sentiment. The analysis followed multiple steps. First, all comments were read to identify recurring themes and language markers. Then, they were coded in SPSS for discursive features such as “othering,” “identity denial,” and “terrorist framing.” These qualitative features were correlated with hate speech severity scores, producing a dataset that maps the intersection of language and ideology in digital discourse.

The most frequent category was Negative Character (24.5%), in which users attacked Kurdish identity with insults like “You are scum,” “Lunatic foolish Zionist,” and “Fake Kurdish lies.” Disagreement (20.8%) followed, with users challenging Kurdish claims without advocating harm, e.g., “This is completely a lie” or “Stop spreading fake news.” Negative Actions (17.0%) attributed harmful behavior to Kurds: “They used kids to bomb police” or “You lied about the children.” More severe levels included Demonizing and Dehumanizing (15.1%), portraying Kurds as subhuman: “Terrorist animals,” “Dirty cavemen,” or “Bitch.” Violence (13.2%) featured calls for harm: “Kill the PKK rats” or “They should be punished.” The most extreme level, Death (9.4%), included genocidal rhetoric like “There should be a massacre” or “Exterminate the terrorists.” As it is shown in *Table 2: Quantitative analysis of hate speech intensity based on Bahador's scale*.

Category title	Percentage	Examples
6. Death	9.4%	“You should all be wiped from the surface of the earth” “We have enough yellow bags in stock. Even for you.”
5. Violence	13.2%	“Kill the PKK rats.” “The end of those who march against us Turks is a corpse bag.”
4. Demonizing and Dehumanizing	15.1%	“Kurds are the virus of this world.” “Dirty cavemen.”
3. Negative character	24.5%	“Lunatic foolish Zionist.” “You are scum.”

2. Negative Actions	17.0%	"They used kids to bomb police." "You lied about the children."
1. Disagreement	20.8%	"Stop spreading fake news." "This is completely a lie!"

Table 2: Quantitative analysis of hate speech intensity based on Bahador's scale

Overall, the data indicate that nearly 40% of comments fall within high to extreme hate categories (Levels 4–6), illustrating the widespread presence of violent, dehumanizing, and death-promoting discourse in anti-Kurdish commentary on Twitter. As it is shown in Figure 2: *Pie Chart of Hate Speech Frequency per Category*.




Figure 2: Pie Chart of Hate Speech Frequency per Category

One important observation is that systemic inequality is often deliberately obscured in these discussions. Kurdish voices are frequently excluded, and their identity is inaccurately equated with terrorism, ignoring the deep historical and political struggles of a stateless people. This form of erasure is what Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) identifies as “silencing”—a mechanism through which power operates not only by what is said but also by what is left unsaid. Recognizing this silence is vital to understanding how language can either reinforce marginalization or contribute to justice and recognition.

Findings and Discussion

This work investigated how non-Kurdish Twitter users, mainly Turkish users, represent Kurds in English tweets using both Fairclough's CDA and Bahador's scale for measuring hate speech. The findings have proved that ethnic hostility is deeply rooted, supported by certain nationalist beliefs, and acted out through offensive and exclusionary ways of speaking or writing. The data make it clear that English provides a new platform for spreading localized ethnic disagreements worldwide.

In terms of quantitative analysis, the results illustrate that a large part of the data belongs to Bahador's average and high-intensity grades, such as Negative Character (24.5%), Demonization and Dehumanization (15.1%), Violence (13.2%), and Death (9.4%). The results confirm the significant impact of online hostility, matching what other studies have revealed: that using the internet often maintains or strengthens ethnic inequalities (Davidson et al., 2017; Matamoros-Fernández & Farkas, 2021). Moreover, Van Dijk's (1993) idea of socio-cognitive discourse is evident in users' use of “rats,” “vermin,” and “scum” to describe minorities, as this further solidifies the in-group's superiority by underestimating and describing the other group as a threat. This form of discourse not only includes insulting language but also makes harassment, surveillance, and aggression appear acceptable.

An important theme is that the dominant group continuously denies Kurdish identity by expressing ideas like “Kurdistan does not really exist” and “Kurds are mountain Turks.” These are examples of state-produced narratives aimed at erasing the identities of minority groups (Bayır, 2013; Sezgin & Wall, 2004). The fact that these claims appear in English-language discourse confirms their international spread,

adapted to appeal to global audiences. When these identity-based demands are dismissed as destabilizing or illegitimate, cultural recognition becomes perceived as a political threat.

Another important aspect of the discourse is the way English is employed in discussions. While English is expected to be an unbiased language, the study discovered that it is also used to gloss over nationalist narratives and frame them as part of the global fight against terrorism. Phrases such as “This isn’t about Kurds, it’s about fighting terrorism” reflect how ethnonationalist violence is reframed to support Western security agendas, thereby covering up underlying racial biases. This aligns with recent studies by Davidson et al. (2017), Matamoros-Fernández and Farkas (2021), and Bouvier and Machin (2018), suggesting that hate speech increasingly adopts legal or policy-related language to appear justified and avoid algorithmic moderation.

In spite of the prominence of hate speech, counter-discourses were also observed. A number of commentators did not show direct anti-Kurdish attitudes; they called for Kurdish-Turkish unity and emphasized national solidarity. For example, phrases like “Turkey is against terrorism, not Kurds” and “brotherhood between Kurds and Turks” were used. However, the majority often attacked those who posted such content, labeling them as propaganda, Zionist, or terrorist sympathizers. As a result, internet discussions on ethnicity are marked by polarization, with only a limited range of ideas gaining traction and little space for inclusive dialogue.

The findings closely align with Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), especially in illustrating how specific language choices—such as recurring metaphors like “vermin,” “rats,” and “scum”—serve to dehumanize and symbolically exclude Kurds from recognized societal identities. These are not simply derogatory terms but markers of deeper ideological narratives that work to legitimize exclusion. At the level of discursive practice, the frequent portrayal of Kurds as “terrorists” and the outright denial of their existence (e.g., claims like “There’s no such thing as Kurdistan”) demonstrate how dominant ideologies are not only propagated by state actors but also perpetuated by everyday users. This reflects how state-endorsed discourse and nationalist myths become embedded within daily communication. On a sociocultural level, such discursive patterns reflect and sustain nationalist ideologies rooted in monoethnic statehood. The portrayal of Kurdish identity as illegitimate, and the framing of pro-Kurdish sentiments as threats, are not accidental; they function ideologically to reinforce systemic marginalization and deny minority rights. The CDA framework, therefore, proves essential in unpacking how digital discourse contributes to the normalization of hate and the reproduction of social inequalities in online public spaces. Combining CDA methods with Bahador’s scale provided clearer insights into the textual, discursive, and social patterns within the data. On the textual level, the use of hostile words, direct commands, and collective generalizations promoted division. The discursive practice engaged with state slogans and catchphrases, aligning user expression with exclusionary ideologies. This research noted that regular users, who at first appear apolitical, help spread ethnonationalist ideologies on the internet.

Compared with previous research, these results align with what Tutkal (2024) found regarding reactive digital ethnonationalism. More cases of hate speech were observed during Turkish military operations against Kurds or when international media addressed Kurdish autonomy. This indicates that geopolitical events play a great role in the rise of online hostility.

Additionally, the major findings of the study can be summarized as follows:

1. Patterns of Exclusion and Dehumanization

Through patterns of exclusion and dehumanization, discursive techniques are enacted.

The rhetorical review has provided evidence of the ongoing use of negative metaphors, derogatory nouns, and group pronouns, which have positioned Kurds as inferior, harmful, or naturally disloyal. Terms such as vermin, scum, rats, and traitors were used repeatedly, and they helped to abstractly marginalize Kurds by

depriving them of accepted conventions. Expressions such as "You are scum, trying to tear our country apart" made Kurdish identities appear criminal and subversive.

This process of dehumanization and othering was often accompanied by identity denial, such as the claim that Kurds are only "mountain Turks" or that there is no such place as Kurdistan. Such narratives worked to discredit Kurdish ethnic identity and present it as a political myth rather than a reality.

2. Nationalist and Ideological Framing

One of the main strategies of the dominant discourse that was tracked is the concept of recontextualization, in which Kurdish cultural or political claims are reframed as threats to national unity or as terroristic activities. Kurdish identity was often equated with the PKK, a declared militant organization, and this association was used to justify discriminatory speech. Nationalist rhetoric such as "Long live Turkey, death to traitors" or "We are all Turks" reinforced a monoethnic state ideology and erased minority pleas for recognition or self-determination.

Additionally, certain remarks were sarcastic or reversed roles, positioning Kurds as aggressors and Turks as victims. Tweets like "We brought them in, and this is how they repay us" illustrate rhetorical strategies that attempt to reverse the roles of victim and oppressor, further demonizing Kurdish political ambitions.

3. The Strategic English Medium

Interestingly, English was not used merely as a means of communication but as a discursive strategy. Users employed English to promote anti-Kurdish sentiment in a globalized context that aligns with Western anti-terrorist discourse. Nationalist propaganda such as "This is not about Kurds but about preventing terrorism" was used to justify nationalist principles and reframe ethnic hostility as a logical security measure, targeting global audiences.

4. Quantitative Distribution of Hate Speech Severity

Each of the comments was categorized under one of the six levels in Bahador's Hate Speech Intensity Scale, distributed as follows:

- Negative Character (24.5%): e.g., "Scum, you are", "Kurdish lies, fake"
- Disagreement (20.8%): e.g., "This is pure lies indeed"
- Negative Actions (17.0%): e.g., "Kids were used to bomb police by them"
- Demonizing & Dehumanizing (15.1%): e.g., "Terrorist animals", "Dirty cavemen"
- Violence (13.2%): e.g., "Kill the PKK rats"
- Death (9.4%): e.g., "A massacre should take place", "Kill the terrorists"

Almost 40 percent of the comments fall within the most severe categories (Levels 4–6), indicating a significant prevalence of dehumanization, calls for violence, and genocidal rhetoric.

5. Changes Over Time and Situational Variation

The data showed that the highest rates of hate speech intensity were associated with significant political or military events involving the Kurds. This indicates that online ethnic hostility is responsive to geopolitical developments, supporting the idea that digital spaces reflect and escalate real-life ethnic conflicts.

In the end, the analysis demonstrates that English-language Twitter is not neutrally used. On Twitter/X, ethnic identities are not only expressed but also contested and reshaped. Nationalist ideologies maximize and legitimize anti-Kurdish narratives, transmitting them across borders and amplifying them through digital platforms. These findings have far-reaching implications for discourse studies and policy efforts aimed at regulating online hate speech. They call for greater critical awareness of the ideological nature of language in global digital communication, particularly when it relates to identity, nationalism, and historical reinterpretation.

Conclusion

This study explored how non-Kurdish individuals, primarily Turks, represent Kurds in English-language Twitter discourse. Employing Fairclough's three-dimensional Critical Discourse Analysis alongside Bahador's Hate Speech Intensity Scale, the research demonstrated that social media, especially Twitter, acts as an effective medium for disseminating ethnic hostility. It revealed how nationalist ideologies and historical conflicts are linguistically rearticulated and projected to global audiences through digital platforms.

The research concluded that many comments contained high levels of hate speech, with frequent use of dehumanizing language, threats, and calls for violence. These expressions confirm the widespread and explicit nature of anti-Kurdish sentiment in online discourse. Strategies such as identity denial, terrorist labeling, and cultural erasure emerged as dominant discursive practices, aiming to delegitimize Kurdish identity both politically and culturally.

Additionally, English was not merely a communication tool but also a strategic medium through which anti-Kurdish narratives were adapted to align with broader global discourses on terrorism and security. This enabled nationalist ideologies to gain international legitimacy and visibility, often reframing ethnic hostility as rational or justified.

These consequences highlight the double edge of social media, as a space for public expression and as a mechanism for reinforcing exclusionary ideologies. The integration of quantitative hate speech measurement with qualitative CDA offered clear insights of how language encodes ethnic conflict in the digital age. Moving forward, addressing online hate speech effectively will require intersectional approaches that consider language, ideology, and platform dynamics, particularly in multilingual and transnational contexts.

This study contributes to that broader understanding by showing how nationalist discourse can be recontextualized and amplified through global digital communication, ultimately calling for more critical awareness and responsive policy frameworks to combat online ethnic hatred.

Recommendations

The findings suggest the need for crucial actions based on a strong foundation to mitigate ethnic hate speech in digital media spaces—specifically in how minorities and stateless nations are represented and defined. This is particularly relevant to the representation of Kurds by non-Kurds within English-language discourse on social media. The recommendations are directed to different groups and agencies as follows:

1. Social Media Platforms (Especially Twitter)

The major recommendation is the need to develop the moderation policy of social media platforms, particularly Twitter. Existing systems usually miss context-sensitive and coded forms of hate speech, especially when articulated in a global language such as English. Platforms should deploy a more context-aware moderation framework that identifies discursive patterns such as dehumanization, identity denial, genocide, and cultural erasure. This involves training moderation algorithms and human reviewers to recognize not only explicit insults but also implicit rhetorical devices that foster ethnic hostility.

2. Moderation Algorithm Developers and Human Reviewers

The introduction of structured typologies such as Bahador's Intense Hate Speech Scale into platform moderation can enhance the subtlety of content evaluation. Instead of relying on binary decisions (delete or keep), a severity-based model would allow a more proportional response to harmful language. Posts that incite violence or promote dehumanization should be removed, while posts containing stereotyping or cultural bias could be addressed through automated warnings or educational prompts.

3. Social Media Platforms and Civil Society Organizations

Beyond algorithmic control, there is an urgent need to promote counter-discourses that affirm Kurdish identity and challenge ethnonationalist narratives. Social media platforms and civil society groups can play a proactive role by promoting the visibility of marginalized voices and supporting campaigns that highlight minority rights. This includes encouraging interaction with culturally inclusive content and creating safe spaces for ethnic minorities to express themselves without fear of retaliation.

4. Educators, Curriculum Designers, and Educational Institutions

Public awareness of digital literacy is a top priority. Users should be educated on how to evaluate online content critically, recognize ideological influences, and avoid contributing to harmful discourse. Introducing

critical thinking and empathy-based learning into school and university curricula can foster deeper understanding and appreciation of diverse cultural perspectives.

5. Researchers and Academic Institutions

Future research should explore hate speech across multilingual contexts instead of focusing solely on English. Examining how digital discrimination operates in different linguistic and cultural environments can provide more comprehensive insights. Such studies would help shape better strategies for addressing online hate and promoting social cohesion.

6. General Public and Internet Users

These actions aim to make the internet and those who use it more informed, just, and empathetic. This, in turn, can help counter the spread of ethnic hate and support the dignity of the Kurdish people and other marginalized communities.

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Appendix

The data of this study includes 530 comments, but only 150 comments are included in this appendix.

1. Fake News
2. A Turk denying the oppression of Kurds? What else is new
3. Unreal 🤔
4. Wait I thought it was 6 Million?

5. lunatic foolish zionists this the best lie that u come up ? 🤡🤡🤡🤡🤡🤡🤡LIAR 🤡🤡🤡
6. Give Gaza to the Kurds. Send Erdogan his Pals as a fair trade.
7. Because the jews are behind it?
8. The number is closer to 2,000,000 (if there are that many Kurds in Syria).You should be happy. Erdogan is doing Israel's bidding by weakening Syria's central government.Are you sure you know what's going on?
9. Since when did Turks become Arabs?! lol good lord
10. If the Jerusalem Post says so it must be true 😏
11. Kurds there dont have phones?
12. Which group of Kurds?
13. 200000 kurdes ? What is doing South Africa ? And Karim Khan
14. Where's the ICC? Karim Khan comments? Hypocrisy
15. Fuk your moth idiot liar
16. Turks killed 1 million Kurds, 2 million Arabs, 3 million Aramis, 4 million Yazidis, and 5 million Syrians in Syria in two days
😏😏😏😏They will do more in three days 😏😏😏What a full 😏
17. Estimated? Who estimated this number? Kurdish terrorists? Count name by name then, all of 200.000. Otherwise you are a big liar.
You should quit begging help from West. You are desperate.
18. Wow, who knew there were 200000 Kurds roaming around waiting to be ethnically cleansed? Stop the joke
19. Do you have a source? I can't find anything about 200,000 Kurds killed in 4 days alone.There has been a seige - no air strikes.It's horrific what is going on and has been for 13 years but you are a liar and you know it and you don't care
20. I thought it was 2 billion kurds.. 🤡🤡🤡
21. You're totally wrong bro, it should be at least 2 million Kurds. The original residents return to their home.
22. Those pkk maxist are Israhelli Force not Kurds
23. Syrians from Türkiye TR returning home after terrorist organisations pkk/ypg have been cleaned out of the region.
24. 2,000,000,000,000,000in0.0000000000000000004miliseconds. Get your facts straight.
25. As I recall, everybody was silent when Saddam was ethnically cleansing them from Iraq, silent when they had ISIS in a corner and were pleading for help.People are pretty selective with their outrage, especially now.
26. Dont act like you care for the kurds.Kurds refugees came to turkey and those rebels attacks kurdish militants.
27. What a load of horseshit lol. Even if they were executing people around the clock and carpet bombing cities to dust theres no way they've killed 200k. Things can be bad and you still dont have to pull outlandish numbers out of your ass.
28. Because it's a lie. You slanderous scum. Turkey has never killed an innocent person. Kurds have every right in Turkey. Moreover, there is no distinction between Turks and Kurds. PKK terrorists are constantly committing massacres in Turkey as puppets of USA.
29. Kurds are going back home to the Zagros Mountains? Why should anyone complain?
30. lmao, why are Kurds in Syria and Iraq fleeing to Turkey if Turkey is oppressing Kurds.
31. Finally, a prudent person. Don't let them fool you. We, Turks never hurt innocent people. The western media is against us. Terrorist organizations (PKK/YPG) are the evil ones and they actually don't care about Kurds and persecute them. They use these lies to exploiting emotions.
32. The tooth fairy brought them after riding in on a unicorn.
33. Rare Turkish W. Have you seen those videos of how Kurdish immigrants behave in Japan? Utterly disgraceful. Thank you Turkey for taking out the trash.
34. HTS is supported by the US, Israel, and Turkey. They took over Aleppo. This resulted in Kurds, Druze, and Syiahs, Alawites fleeing Aleppo. Apparently, Christians stayed.
35. Those are either sandbags or terrorists.
36. Someone tell this cuckold what SDF(PKK) did in Tel Rifat and how they depopulated Arab villllages.
37. No Jews no news... what Israel should have done is try to arm the Kurds then it would have been major news.
38. In four days? 200.000 people, luahahhahahah bro turkey have many Kurdish citizen at the moment, you are absolutely lying 🤡
39. so they ethnically cleansed them to take them into their country and take care of them? 😏
40. Israel should send the confiscated Hezbollah weapons to the Kurds.
41. We will continue ridding this world from the #Kurdish terrorism until the last terrorist burns in hell. No matter what!
42. Just 200k thats a shame i expectes at least 50 million
43. While you guys PKK/YPG killing Syrian people Nobody said anything. Now Syrian people are getting back what belongs to them.
44. Advocate of Israel has spoken; when did you visit Türkiye? You don't know anything about Türkiye you can only be pro PKK like Israel.
45. Shut the fuck up and stop lying and spreading propaganda.
46. It's fake Turkish people like you that try to divide Turkey.
47. So, is this the final hour? Is this the end of the world, everything is contextualised he was talking about the end of times when major wars will happen, if someone attacks you you will not defend or what?
48. Lies they have their party Halkların Demokratik Partisi and they get the same citizenship turks have and same school and same jobs and they have airport etc . Nothing in common with Palestinians. Disgusting Zionists lies.
49. This is my lawyer and he says I can roast the moron too.
50. How many turks have Kurds raped, murdered and kidnapped? Reasons matter.

51. Lies kurds have their party Halkların Demokratik Partisi and they get the same citizenship turks have and same school and same jobs and they have airport etc . Nothing in common with Palestinians. Disgusting Zionists lies.
- 53 1 Türkiye has had 2 Kurdish presidents the most recent being Türgüt Özal 2- Hûda par is a Kurdish political party as is DEM both competing in local elections 3 - Kurmanci is not banned 4- Ibrahim Tatlis has many songs in Kurdish and is loved across the nation.
- 54 Erdogan appealed to the world, said that "a joint Commission of Historians should be established to investigate whether there is a genocide or not" to clarify the so-called Armenian Genocide, and all imperialist-spirited countries ignored Erdogan's offer. Why do you think?
- 55 Like u Zionist 🤖 they shld go back to Kurdistan
- 56 Türkiye isnt fighting the Kurds. It is fighting the PKK, which is considered a terrorist organization in many parts of the world. And the PKK is also an Israel lover like you. 😏
- 57 Some tribes are funded for trouble making . They are provided with enough resources that they become traitors. The ones funding them know exactly what is happening because they wanted the countries not to flourish. It sad we created too many enemies on each nation borders.
- 58 There are Kurdish government signs and writings in eastern Turkey where HDP is ruling and also there is literally Trt Kurdi which is Kurdish channel for the government's channel also high ranking ministers and the president himself has done deals with Barzani before. Stop yappin.
- 59 Türkiye doesn't like different. Kurds are different, Alevi are different and so are any other "minorities".
- 60 Such rubbish. Kurds have equal rights as all other Turkish citizens. Many countries have separatist movements - Scotland/ Catalonia/ Northern Ireland etc. Combatting terrorism and separatism is a political question. The Turks didn't attack 2m Kurds indiscriminately.
- 61 That is the stupidest post today. The tribal lands have autonomy and their own government. I live near several of them.
- 62 Really?) Do they have an anthem, a coat of arms, a constitution, embassies, representation in the United Nations?) Don't Make My Slippers Laugh Anymore
- 63 Israel pay for Kurdish people a lot of money to make a trouble for 4 countries.
- 64 He killed people that were being funded by Israel, UK, USA FR Fact trying to trying to destabilise the area for the colonial powers to bleed it dry.
- 65 You and that phony rabbi schmoly are brother? Got the same fvcked up nose
- 66 You've had a Kurdish president and a bunch of Kurdish ministers work for the government nowadays .you spoiled brat never stop complaining about false accusations of discrimination. How pathetic you are. You'd had same issue as Algerians with French if Turkey didn't fight for you.
- 67 First you can look at both, second kurds are not brutalised to the extent as Palestinians. And third the kurds have much more rights in Arab countries like Syria and Iraq when compared to Israel
- 68 Yeah that tend to happen when a bunch of ethnonationalists lead by Ocalan try to establish marxist state in a conservative area. It of course did not bother Apo how many Kurds his buddies in the Assad family murdered. Tell the full story.
- 69 kurdistan is not a country lol
- 70 And mark my words people like you eventually realise why this oppression toward Kurds happen soon enough. In Japan they start to learn about it XD "Ban their parties" the same parties that openly work with terrorist. I think you just disconnected from Türkiye way too much.
- 71 it's got nothing to do with race.. i don't know where you got that from.
- 72 You probably don't know how wars go? If you don't want anyone to die don't start a war
- 73 Israel is at the apex of the problem. The Zionist M.O. is to infiltrate instigate, and provoke for division and conflict to achieve conquering. They did it in Gaza with their creation of Hamas and doing it in other countries too. Guess which ones!
- 74 turkey has countless kurdish lawyers, businessmen, actors, politicians, ministers... in the past we had kurdish prime ministers and a president. the pkk on the other hand is a terrorist organization that wants to divide the country... please get your facts straight.
- 75 his incident is completely a lie! terrorist organizations were tying bombs to children and sending them to the police! They are being checked for security measures!
- 76 You are a dishonest provocateur. It's not a prison, it's a mountain top at midnight. How did you know that they were Kurds? Kurds are not persecuted in this country. Becomes prime minister, minister, , doctor, teacher Turks are Kurdish brothers, you are scum.
- 77 This image is proof that you are so vile that you use children in bombings.
- 78 free electricity, all kinds of health education opportunities, social own the management of more than half of the hotels in the Aegean and Mediterranean. Apparently, this inspection was made as a result of an incident. What disgustingly perceptive people you are
- 79 You re fucking liar , you know its not true
- 80 Bcs you using them for alive bombing or sending them to mountains
- 81 Holding their reins and sharing what Israel did to Palestine. Kurdish children are very happy in our country. Let there not be a state of liars.
- 82 Liar bitch
- 83 Hahaha Propaganda old vid
- 84 If you listen correctly they say "Çocukları alet etmişler" it means: "they inculcated childrens in" so this means after attack in Ankara, kurds use childrens to attack. Don't make lies you stupid bastard arab!
- 85 Yes because kurdish people of support is terrorist
- 86 No please they are terörist people you dont sad

- 87 Go fuck yourself ugly bitchhhh, you are just fucking terörist, Middle Eastern rat bitch 😏
- 88 I was proud as a Turk
- 89 Im proud of have a Genghis Khan's DNA.
- 90 I didnt See any arrests please stop spreading false Information he was just checking for weapons and bombs.
- 91 But why would they do this ? The answer is PKK members are using the children to carry explosives on them just to kill few soldiers so tell me who's hurting the children in this case ?
- 92 You put bombs on those little children. Is it a crime when the Turkish soldier calls?
- 93 The only reason is that ur using that innocent children as suicide bombers!!! thats why we ve to check them!!!
- 94 Fuck You Bitch..
- 95 This video belongs to the "wall" incidents that took place in 2015 - 2016. It was an operation against the PKK terrorist organization established in the city. Civilians are being evacuated from the area where terrorists are located.
- 96 However, such measures were taken because terrorists also used civilians. Dozens of martyrs were lost in this operation. However, it was a flat land. It could be finished in a few hours without any loss. However, thousands of civilians could have lost their lives.
- 97 Türkiye was also not happy with this way of treating innocent civilians. But there was no other way to distinguish it. these civilians you see are still alive. Tons of bombs were not dropped by jets over their heads.
- 98 Weren't you the ones who made children become suicide bombers and rushed at the soldiers?
- 99 You are the ones who put bombs even in the Quran, you always hide behind children and women and commit massacres, you sons of bitches.
- 100 Get a DNA check and you will findout you are mixed raced with kurdisch and Greek and Armenia heritage .
- 101 Out of 600 representatives in Turkey's parliament, 450 are ethnic kurds. So, I would question validity of this video.
- 102 It's not that! The PKK terrorist organization has previously forced young Kurdish children to carry weapons and bombs for them. Turkish soldiers found out when one of the children's fathers had to tell about it. PKK has threatened to kidnap the children.
- 103 No way lies and slander They all need to be controlled because of the suicide bomber parent Because the Turkish army is merciful, terrorists use women and children first.
- 104 stop spreading fake news. I remember this video Turkish soldiers have to be careful because Kurds send kids with bombs. They are just checking if they hide any bombs on them.
- 105 PKK fighters are child murderers, Turkey is not bombing innocent children.
- 106 Where is kurdistan mate ?
- 107 is it kurdistan? Puahahahahahahah you no have a country and nation
- 108 you haven't country also you don't have hospital :D
- 109 Completely different situation. Kurdish minority living in Turkey claiming to be occupied and resorting to acts of terror is not the same.
- 110 Bro they want there own country in turkey not happening and we're gonna take Iraq so y'all are a pain in the head
- 111 Turkish armed forces only shoot terrorists holding AK47s, not Kurds. I am an infantryman in the air force, my Kurdish brothers are serving and carrying the Turkish flag on their shoulders, Turkey is not like Iraq, if you try to take our land, bombs will fall on you.
- 112 Doesn't that tell you something? No one likes Kurds 😏
- 113 Because there is no Kurdistan
- 114 Where is Kurdistan?
- 115 If 270.000 of 300.000 are from Turkey, I suppose that Turkey will change of your future maybe 😏
- 116 🤡🤡🤡🤡🤡 jewish and kurdisch are always stupid 😏
- 117 Only in yours dream
- 118 Turkey has pushed the PKK back from certain areas by blocking its route to the Mediterranean and advancing to control terrorism in Iraq. Drawing maps doesn't change the real situation. Turkish forces are not like the SAA, Hamas, or Hezbollah.
- 119 As long as Turks exist in this geography, this map will never be realized. Good dreams.
- 120 Turks draw their map with blood trNot with paints...
- 121 😏New paint user..Dreams and realities..
- 122 Turkey would never allow a a Kurdish country to exist on its borders
- 123 Erdogan is fucking all terrorists at all even US supply arms terrorists
- 124 Fighters ? Did you mean terorist ?
- 125 pkk fighters ? you call them as fighters sorry man i can not follow you anymore
- 126 how many Turkish soldiers killed and how many wounded? "the Guerrilla resistance trenches were bombed 53 times with phosphorous shells, banned bombs and chemical weapons", " the Guerrilla forces carried out 32 operations, killing 6 soldiers of the occupation"
- 127 ABD supporting to many terrorist organisations
- 128 The PKK terrorist organization has been rooted out. We are chasing those who managed to escape. We know very well who the countries that provide arms and ammunition support are.
- 129 Wonderful news! Need to wipe out more of the rats 🐭
- 130 Not fighters . they are racist facist terrorists being slave And dog of imperialism.
- 131 Terrorists, even for USA
- 132 Us Terrorists' faith is grave.

- 133 Despite of Us and Europe support them..
- 134 You know lies and manipulation very well. It is not hitting the civilian Kurdish people, but the terrorist PKK camps
- 135 Turkish Forces targets PKK/ SDF terrorists in Iraq and Syria.Türkiye is not Israel. We are a strong army and we have rules, we are moral. If we were not there would be a massacre, only 5 people would not have died. Use your brains.
- 136 It is obviously shown that terror attack in Turkey was prepared by Ziotards. Because every single Ziotards account is mentioning this to shif reality of Palestinians genocide.
- 137 No children, women or babies killed. That's why no one protest. Don't try to compare your terrorist state (İL).
- 138 Israel is behind the terrorist attack on Turkey. When the Turks bombed the base of the terrorist organization, all Zionist perception calculations came into play. You are giving yourself away and making a fool of yourself. You are the ones who bomb civilians and kill children.
- 139 It's clear what lies behind this double standard
- 140 Ohh yea yea we get it, when kurds kill our people there is no problem, but when we do it it's bad. Okay dude 😏😏
- 141 Turkey attack bcoz in training campus of ankara had terrorist attack in which 5 people died and 22 are in critical situation
- 142 Self defense is a human rightTR🇹🇷
- 143 1st - There's no country such as Kurdistan. It's Iraq and Syria2nd - In or out of Turkish borders, PKK is
- 144 always attacking Turkish army, raiding villages and killing civilians3rd - Turkey is running exterior operations to cut the service lines of PKK3rd - You're a dumbass.
- 145 I wish you actually went to PKK camp so they would use you as a sex slave just like they use innocent kurdish girls.
- 146 I believe there is iraq -İran and syria on that lands! First you need to learn geography after history finally how the became a honourable person !! By the way !! Türkiye can pay you more than terrorists
- 147 Hahaha))) sorry grandma Turkis army there and will do anything to sevre Türkiye.
- 148 Fredika, Turkey did not take these Kurdish territories 30 years ago. Turks have ruled this region for more than a thousand years. So what kind of invading are we talking about? Then can you say, "The Turks are invading the Roman Empire!"?
- 149 Wtf kurdi*tan where is the kurdi*tan can you show me in maps
- 150 Frederik, I think you have memory loss due to aging. Those lands have been Turkish territory for 1000 years and the PKK is a terrorist organization. I don't think your problem is the Kurds. You are after a great Israel. The Kurds are just tools.
- 151 Show me Kürdistan on the map? There is no country Kürdistan. Thats why our forces attacking terrorists camps.